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Abstract
The choice of language is a crucial decision for rms competing
in cultural goods and media markets with a bilingual or multilingual
consumer base. To the extent that multilingual consumers have pref-
erences over the intrinsic characteristics (content) as well as over the
language of the product, we can examine the e¢ ciency of market out-
comes regarding linguistic diversity. In this paper, I extend the spokes
model and introduce language as an additional dimension of product
di¤erentiation. I show that: (i) if rms supply their product in a
single language (the adoption model) then the degree of linguistic di-
versity is ine¢ ciently low, and (ii) if some rms supply more than one
linguistic version (the translation model) then in principle the mar-
ket outcome may exhibit insu¢ cient or excessive linguistic diversity.
However, excessive diversity is associated to markets where the frac-
tion of products in the minority language is disproportionately high
with respect to the relative size of the linguistic minority.
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1 Introduction
Producers of cultural goods (like books and lms) and media products (news-
papers, TV and radio) can only make their specic contents available to their
audiences and readerships through a particular language. The choice of lan-
guage is a trivial decision if consumers are monolingual. However, in many
local markets, as well as in the global market, a substantial fraction of con-
sumers are competent in more than one language. It is precisely the presence
of multilingual consumers that makes language selection a di¢ cult decision
for rms and a sensitive issue for the general public. Let us rst discuss this
topic in the context of the global market. It is well known that the expansion
of English as a second language has accelerated over the last decades.1 Some
commentators have expressed their concern about the potential negative ef-
fect of this expansion on the presence and di¤usion of other languages. For
now the signals are weak but non-negligible. For instance, US and UK-based
TV stations specialized in international news are attracting larger audiences
around the world. At the same time stations based in non-English speaking
countries have set up English channels (Al Jazeera, Russia Today, France
24)2. Films and books originally made in English already enjoy a clearly
dominant position in world markets, although they are typically translated
or dubbed into local languages. However, incentives to pay the costs of trans-
lation and dubbing may be signicantly reduced as consumerscompetence
in English is enhanced.
Clearly, both the expansion of English as a second language and the in-
tegration of cultural goods and media markets is likely to speed up in the
coming years and will probably convey very substantial benets. However,
they may also involve signicant costs and market failures that we need to
pay attention to. In particular, the reduction in the degree of linguistic di-
versity may specically harm monolingual social groups; but more generally,
it may negatively a¤ect those consumers whose mother tongue is not English
1According to The Economist (Dec 13th 2006) nearly a quarter of the worlds popula-
tion speaks some English. That includes those who speak it as their mother tongue (400
million), and those who speak it uently as their second language (another 400 million).
It is also estimated that about a billion are learning it. Graddol (2006) argues that the
last gure is likely to double within a decade.
2The incentives to adopt English are probably stronger on the internet. A prominent
example is the electronic version of Der Spiegel, Spiegel Online International. Some major
European newspapers are also considering similar moves.
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and have a preference for consuming these products in a di¤erent language.
Moreover, the presence of a particular language in the media and cultural
goods markets is crucial for its vitality and prestige, potentially inuencing
its medium and long-term dynamics.
Geographic areas where the majority of the population is bilingual can
provide useful insights on the long-run implications of the expansion of Eng-
lish. Take the example of Catalonia. A very large fraction of the 7 million
inhabitants can speak and read the two main languages: Catalan and Span-
ish (Castilian). Surveys conducted over the last twenty years indicate that
Spanish is the family language for roughly half of the population, while Cata-
lan is for the other half (data on daily use of the two languages also show
approximately the same fty-fty pattern.)3 One could naively expect that
one half of consumption of cultural goods and media products in Catalo-
nia would be in Catalan and the other half in Spanish. But this is not the
case, especially if we focus on non-subsidized, privately provided goods and
services. More specically, 24% of the TV audience consumes programs in
Catalan, but only a tiny fraction is broadcast by private stations. Similarly,
43% of the radio audiences correspond to programs in Catalan, but the frac-
tion that is supplied by private radio stations is also small. Private supply
in Catalan is higher in the newspaper and book markets. About 22% of the
newspapers and 20% of books (excluding textbooks) consumed in Catalo-
nia are in Catalan. Finally, the consumption of lms dubbed into Catalan
or originally produced in this language is close to zero (subtitles are rarely
used in Spain).4 It is important to emphasize that only a few extra mil-
lion consumers outside Catalonia speak or read Catalan, while in most of
these examples the relevant market is either Spain (46 million, all competent
in Spanish) or the worlds Spanish speaking population (approximately, 400
millions.)
These indicators can be interpreted in di¤erent ways. Nevertheless, the
low private provision of products in Catalan, combined with the wide political
3See, for instance, Generalitat de Catalunya (2003), Les estadístiques dusos lingüís-
tics. The most recent surveys (Les estadístiques dusos lingüístics, 2008) indicate that the
fraction of the Catalan-oriented population has fallen below 50%, probably as a result of
recent immigration ows. However, the fty-fty distribution is still a good approximation
for consumers of books, newspapers and lms (Baròmetre de la Comunicació i la Cultura,
2008).
4These indicators have been provided by industry associations and audience monitoring
agencies. The gures given in the text are averages over the period 1999-2008.
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support for the public nancing of TV and radio stations that broadcast
programs exclusively in Catalan5, suggest that market outcomes might be
biased against minority languages.
As suggested above, the relationship between linguistic preferences and
market outcomes is dynamic with causality running both ways. This paper
contributes to our understanding of these issues by focusing on the causality
from preferences to outcomes. In particular, I ask whether or not markets
tend to provide too little linguistic diversity, for a given distribution of lin-
guistic preferences. Thus, I analyze a static model of product variety where
consumers have preferences over the intrinsic characteristics (content) as well
as the language of the product.6 The model is agnostic about the origin of
linguistic tastes. A preference for a particular language may simply reect
higher prociency or, on the contrary, the desire to learn the language. It
could also emerge from ideological, or even esthetic, reasons. Consumers be-
long to distinct linguistic communities of unequal size. These communities
are not completely segmented, in the sense that members of the minority are
bilingual, while the majority members may be bilingual (symmetric bilin-
gualism) or monolingual (asymmetric bilingualism). Bilingual consumers are
not indi¤erent about the language of the product; they strictly prefer to con-
sume products in one of the languages (say, their mother tongue), although
they may be willing to consume products in their second language depending
on availability, content preferences, and price di¤erentials.
The model extends the spokes framework (Chen and Riordan, 2007) by
adding an additional dimension of product di¤erentiation (language). Thus,
consumers may trade o¤ a good match in terms of content against a good
linguistic match. In fact, a key parameter of the model is the degree of lin-
guistic substitutability relative to the substitutability of contents. It is very
convenient to start o¤ by assuming that each variety (dened by its content)
must be supplied in a single language (the adoption model). Next, the analy-
sis is extended by allowing rms to provide more than one linguistic version
of each variety (the translation model). In the real world, translations are
not restricted to books and lms, but nowadays they are somewhat present
5The charter of the Catalan TV and radio networks was approved in the regional
parliament by unanimity in 1983. It was reformed in 2007 with the support of 87% of the
members of the parliament.
6There is a huge literature on optimal product diversity. The most signicant milestones
include Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Salop (1979), Mankiw and Whinston (1986) and Chen
and Riordan (2007). These are models where product di¤erentiation is unidimensional.
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in most segments of cultural goods and media markets.
The main results of the paper are the following. Firstly, in the adop-
tion model market forces are biased against minority languages; that is, the
fraction of varieties in the minority language supplied in equilibrium is be-
low the level that maximizes total surplus (the level of linguistic diversity
is ine¢ ciently low). Let us consider the social planners problem. If the
degree of linguistic substitutability is not too high (with respect to the size
of the minority community) then it is e¢ cient to supply a positive fraction
of varieties in the minority language, since a fraction of consumers can be
assigned to products on the basis of their linguistic preferences, which more
than compensates the content mismatch. In fact, as the degree of linguistic
substitutability falls (i.e., the intensity of linguistic preferences increases), or
as the size of the minority community increases, then the optimal fraction
of varieties in the minority language increases. However, private incentives
to supply goods in the minority language are smaller than social incentives.
The main driving force of this result is the size of the consumer base. Actu-
ally, this is the only force in a regulated environment where prices are xed
exogenously (and independently of the language of the product). In this case,
no rm would ever nd it protable to supply its product in the minority
language, since that would imply lower sales. In an unregulated environ-
ment, however, some rms may be willing to specialize, adopt the minority
language, and take advantage of the higher willingness to pay of members
of the minority linguistic community. However, a rm that switches to the
minority language is unable to capture all the surplus generated.
The second main result concerns the translation model. In this case,
the market outcome may exhibit insu¢ cient or excessive linguistic diversity.
However, unlike most models of product di¤erentiation, the sign of the inef-
ciency can be associated to the value of observable variables. In particular,
excessive diversity arises only in markets where the cost of translation is so
low that the fraction of products in the minority language is disproportion-
ately high with respect to the relative size of the linguistic minority. In order
to understand this result it is important to note that in the extreme symmet-
ric case where both linguistic communities have the same size, despite of the
fact that the level of linguistic diversity is always e¢ cient, the market alloca-
tion is ine¢ cient because rms tend to generate too many translations. The
reason is that most consumers attracted by a second linguistic version of a
particular variety come from rival rms (business stealing e¤ect). Thus, back
in the asymmetric case, the ambiguous result is a combination of the forces
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described in the adoption model and the excessive incentives to translate. In
particular, if the cost of translation is relatively high then we are very close
to the adoption model. In contrast, if the cost of translation is su¢ ciently
low then in equilibrium most rms o¤er a second linguistic version in order
to steal consumers from rival rms.
Summarizing, the adoption model formalizes the widespread perception
that market forces tend to work against minority languages. However, the
e¢ ciency of market outcomes is likely to improve as the application of new
technologies reduces the costs of translations. If the cost reduction is su¢ -
ciently drastic then the sign of the ine¢ ciency can even be reversed.
There is a growing literature on the economics of language, which has
examined a broad range of issues, such as the acquisition of a second lan-
guage (Selten and Pool, 1991; Church and King, 1993, and Lazear, 1999),
the intergenerational transmission of mother tongues (John and Yi, 2001),
the role of language in foreign trade (Melitz, 2007b), the choice of o¢ cial
languages in multilingual societies (Ginsburgh et al., 2005), and the relation-
ship between language policy and human capital accumulation (Ortega and
Tangeras, 2008). To the best of my knowledge the issue of language adoption
in cultural goods and media markets has not yet been the subject of formal
economic analysis.
More closely related to the present paper is the work about the impact
of English dominance on literary translation (Melitz, 2007a; Ginsburgh et
al., 2007.) These papers consider a very di¤erent framework with completely
segmented markets and monolingual consumers.
The next section presents the adoption model. Section 3 is devoted to
the translation model. Some concluding remarks close the paper.
2 Language adoption
2.1 A model of symmetric bilingualism
The model builds on the spokes framework recently presented by Chen and
Riordan (2007), which provides a (spatial) representation of consumer pref-
erences over an arbitrary number of di¤erentiated products. I interpret such
a preference space as referring to the intrinsic characteristics (content) of
cultural goods and media products. On the top of this, I introduce an ad-
ditional dimension of product di¤erentiation: the language of the product.
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I restrict myself to the case that the number of active rms is equal to the
number of potential varieties.7 Also, in order to enhance tractability, I use
the continuous approximation of the spokes framework proposed by Caminal
and Granero (2008). Thus, the fraction of products supplied in a particular
language is a continuous variable.
More specically, the model considers a continuum of rms (mass one)
and consumers (also, mass one.) Each rm produces a di¤erentiated product,
which can be supplied in one of two possible languages, S and C. In the next
section I allow rms to supply two linguistic versions of the good, one in S
and one in C.
Each consumer has a preference for only two varieties (dened in terms of
intrinsic characteristics) and consumes one unit of one of these two varieties.
In fact, each consumers identity is given by three elements: the pair of
selected varieties, the relative preference for these two varieties (location in
the [0; 1] segment) and the preferred language. Let us examine these three
elements sequentially.
Consumers are uniformly distributed over all possible pairs of varieties.
This implies, in particular, that the subset of consumers that have a prefer-
ence for a particular variety are also uniformly distributed over their second
variety. Thus, each rm has a negligible e¤ect on the demand faced by any
other individual rm (monopolistic competition.)
A fraction  of all consumers prefer to buy goods supplied in the C-
language and 1    in the S-language. I will refer to the rst group as C-
consumers and to the second group as S-consumers. I assume that  2  0; 1
2

,
and hence we call C and S the minority and majority language, respectively.
Another important modeling choice concerns the correlation between lan-
guage and non-language (content) preferences. In the limiting case of perfect
correlation, C-consumers would be exclusively interested in a fraction  of
all possible varieties and S-consumers in the remaining 1 : In this case the
language adoption decision would be trivial. Alternatively, I will focus on the
opposite extreme scenario and assume zero correlation between preferences
about language and non-language characteristics (and zero correlation with
respect to relative preferences.) Thus, all rms face a customer base with
the same distribution of linguistic preferences.
7If the number of rms is endogenously determined by a zero prot condition then in
equilibrium there may be excessive or insu¢ cient entry. Here, we are exclusively concerned
with linguistic diversity and therefore it is very convenient to keep the diversity of intrinsic
characteristics xed. In Section 4 I discuss the implications of this assumption.
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Consumers with a preference for varieties i and j are uniformly distrib-
uted in the interval [0; 1] ; which represents the intensity of their relative
preferences for their intrinsic characteristics. Thus, a consumer located at
x 2 [0; 1], obtains a utility of R  x   if she consumes one unit variety i
and R  (1  x)   if she consumes one unit of variety j. In the jargon of
standard spatial models, I assume linear transportation costs and normalize
the unit cost to one. Variable  takes value 0 if the product is supplied
in the most preferred language and 1; otherwise. Thus,  > 0 represents
the reduction in utility associated to the use of the least preferred language
(language mismatch).
I assume that R    > 2; in order to guarantee that in equilibrium all
consumers are served, and that rms are subject to constant and identical
marginal costs, which for simplicity are normalized to zero. Finally, I restrict
the analysis to the case  < 2; otherwise rms supplying goods in di¤erent
languages would not compete with each other.
2.2 The rst best
Let us denote by  the fraction of varieties supplied in C. For a given ;
there is a fraction 2 of consumers whose two selected varieties are supplied
in C, a fraction 2 (1  ) with one variety in S and one in C, and a fraction
(1  )2 with both varieties in S.
For those consumers facing two varieties with the same language then
e¢ ciency requires the allocation of consumers to the closest variety. Thus,
the total surplus that can be obtained by consumers with access to two C-
varieties and two S-varieties is R  1
4
 (1  ) and R  1
4
 , respectively.
The average transportation costs is in both cases 1
4
; and the only di¤erence
is the weight of the language mismatch.
The optimal allocation of consumers with access to two varieties supplied
in di¤erent languages will obviously depend on their language preferences.
Without loss of generality suppose that the variety supplied in C is located
at zero and the variety supplied in S is located at one. Thus, C-consumers
should consume the variety located at zero, if and only if x  min1+
2
; 1
	
.
If  < 1 then 1+
2
< 1 and those C-consumers close to 1 must consume the
variety supplied in S (the linguistic mismatch is dominated by the intensity
of preferences over intrinsic characteristics.) However, if   1 it is optimal
to allocate consumers exclusively according to their linguistic preferences.
Thus, the maximum surplus obtained in those segments with one variety in
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each language, A () ; is given by R  1
4
  
2
+ 
2
4
if  < 1, and R  1
2
otherwise.
Thus, total welfare, W , can be written as:
W () = 2

R  1
4
  (1  )

+2 (1  )A ()+ (1  )2

R  1
4
  

Thus, if  < 1 the optimal fraction of varieties in the minority language,
, is:
 = max

0;
1
2
  1  2


First, note that  > 0 if and only if   2 (1  2). Second,  < :
Third,  increases with both  and . In order to gain some intuition let us
consider the case  = 0. If variety i switches from S to C, then all consumers
who have a taste for variety i, face a choice between a variety in C and a
variety in S. In this case, because of the linguistic switch S-consumers in
average will loose 
 
1  
2

< ; since some of them will switch to their
alternative variety (supplied in S). In contrast, C-consumers will gain in
average 
 
1 + 
2

> , since more consumers will be induced to purchase
variety i. Thus, only if  is su¢ ciently high,  
 
1 + 
2

> (1  )  1  
2

,
it is e¢ cient to supply variety i in S. Also, as  and  increase the surplus
associated to supplying varieties in C also increases.
If   1;
 = max

0;
  1
4
  1
2

Thus,  > 0 if and only if  > 1
4
: The area of parameter values for
which  > 0 is depicted in Figure 1.
2.3 Market equilibrium
In the market game rms will adopt a particular language depending on its
relative protability. In a regulated environment where prices cannot vary
with the language, adopting the minority language implies lower sales and
hence it cannot be protable. Instead, if prices are endogenous, an individual
rm may nd it optimal to adopt the minority language, charge a higher
price, and exploit the higher willingness to pay of C-consumers.
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The specic details of the equilibrium do depend on rms ability to
price discriminate between members of di¤erent language communities. If
the linguistic composition of consumers exhibits su¢ cient regional variation,
then rms have incentives to set di¤erent prices in di¤erent regions. For
convenience, I present rst the perfect discrimination case (geographically
segmented linguistic communities.) In Section 2.4 I discuss the case of no
price discrimination.
Given that each individual rm has a negligible inuence on other rms
decisions, it does not matter whether language adoption and price decisions
are taken sequentially or simultaneously.
Let pk (l) be the price charged by a variety supplied in the k language to
the l community, k; l = C; S: Consider, for instance, the price charged to S-
consumers by rm i supplying the good in S. A fraction  of these consumers
have a variety in C as an alternative choice, while a fraction (1  ) have a
variety in S. If we denote rm is price by pi then the prot function can be
written as:
i = pi



1 + + pC (S)  pi

+ (1  ) 1 + pS (S)  pi	
provided that 1 + + pC (S)  pi  2:
If we evaluate the rst order condition of an interior solution at pi =
pS (S) ; then the "joint" reaction function is given by:
pS (S) =
1 + 

+ pC (S)

1 + 
The other three optimization problems provide three more equations. By
solving the system we obtain the candidates to (symmetric, pure strategy)
equilibrium prices:
pS (S) = 1 +

2
pC (S) = 1   (1  )
2
pC (C) = 1 +
 (1  )
2
pS (C) = 1  
2
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We still need to check that, given these prices, no rm wishes to deviate.
It turns out that if  is su¢ ciently close to 2 (the threshold is a decreas-
ing function of ) then a rm supplying the product in S nds it optimal
to charge C-consumers a price higher than
 
1  
2

and serve only those
consumers who only have access to two varieties in S. Similarly, a rm sup-
plying the product in C nds it optimal to charge S-consumers a price higher
than

1  (1 )
2

and serve only those consumers who only have access to
two varieties in C. It turns out that for these parameter values there is no
symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies.
Note that a rm that supplies its product in a particular language charges
a higher price to those consumers that prefer that language: pk (k) > pk (l) ; k =
C; S; and l 6= k. In fact, the price di¤erential, pk (k)  pk (l) ; decreases with
the fraction of products supplied in k.
The rms prots depend on the language adopted and the language
distribution:
S () = 

1  
2
2
+ (1  )

1 +

2
2
C () = 

1 +
 (1  )
2
2
+ (1  )

1   (1  )
2
2
In equilibrium S (e) = C (e), provided e > 0; which implies that:
e = max

0;
1
2
  2 (1  2)


Note that e > 0 if and only if  > 4 (1  2) : Figure 1 shows that the
area of parameter values for which e > 0 is smaller than than the area
corresponding to  > 0: More generally, we can compare the equilibrium
allocation with the rst best (Figure 2 draws e and  for a given value of
):
Proposition 1 The equilibrium of the adoption model exhibits insu¢ cient
linguistic diversity, in the sense that the fraction of varieties in the minority
language is ine¢ ciently low; i.e., e  ; and provided  > 0 then e < :
In order to gain some intuition about the discrepancy between social and
private incentives, let us consider the case  = 0: Equilibrium prices are
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pS(S) = pS (C) = 1; pC (S) = 1   
2
; pC (C) = 1 + 
2
: If a particular rm
considers switching from S to C, then this would cause an upward shift in
the demand by C-consumers and a downward shift in the demand by S-
consumers. Figure 3 reects the shift in demand by C-consumers, drawn for
the case  < 1. The shaded area, A + B + C + D; represents the increase
in total welfare. However, the rm cannot appropriate all this extra surplus
because it faces two conicting goals and has only one instrument: the price.
On the one hand, the rm adopting C would like to extract the extra surplus
from their previous customers. On the other hand, it would like to attract
new consumers (business stealing). If the rm charges pC (C) = 1 + ; then
total sales remain unchanged, and the rm captures all the extra surplus
from existing customers but it attracts no new consumer. In this case, the
extra prots are equivalent to area A. If instead the rm charges pC (C) = 1;
then total demand has increased by an amount equal to . In this case, it
attracts an e¢ cient amount of new consumers but it does not obtain any
extra prots from existing customers. In this case, the total amount of extra
prots would be given by areas E+F , which is equivalent to A. The optimal
price is an intermediate one, pC (C) = 1 + 
2
, which reects the optimal
balance between these two conicting goals. Maximum prots are given by
areas E + F + C = A + C: Thus, the rm is unable to capture the entire
surplus: it misses B +D.
The argument for S-consumers is analogous: the prot loss is larger than
the loss in total welfare.
2.4 Discussion
2.4.1 No price discrimination
The assumption that rms can perfectly discriminate between members of
di¤erent linguistic communities was very convenient, but it may not be a
good approximation in some real world examples. In the Appendix I analyze
the opposite extreme case where rms charge the same price to all consumers.
It turns out that rms adopting C are harmed more intensively if they cannot
price discriminate, and as a result incentives to adopt C are further reduced,
which exacerbates the market bias against minority languages.8
8The set of parameter values for which there is no symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies is also higher than in the case of price discrimination.
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2.4.2 Asymmetric bilingualism
In the benchmark model I assumed that members of both linguistic commu-
nities are bilingual in the sense that they are competent in both languages,
although every consumer has a preference for consuming the product in one
of the languages. In some real world examples a fraction of consumers are
monolingual and as a result language choices a¤ect aggregate sales. An im-
portant observation is that members of small language communities tend to
be competent in at least a second language, while the proportion of mono-
lingual consumers is higher in large language communities. Thus, it makes
sense to consider an alternative specication of the present model where C-
consumers are bilingual and have the preferences described in the benchmark
model (they experience a utility loss  if they consume the good in S) but
S-consumers are monolingual and hence experience an innite utility loss if
they consume the good in C.
In the Appendix I analyze both the rst best allocation and the market
equilibrium of this version of the model. I show that both  and e are
lower than in the benchmark model, which is a very intuitive result. What
is more important, is that the main insights brought about by Proposition 1
remain unchanged:   e; and if  > 0 then  > e (market outcomes
are biased against minority languages).
2.4.3 Advertising
Suppliers of some media products (TV, radio) charge a zero price to con-
sumers. Instead, they obtain revenue from advertising. Does the nancing
channel a¤ect the language choice? Let us consider a version of the present
model where rms charge a zero price but they obtain an advertising revenue
A. Consumersnet utility is a decreasing function of the intensity of advertis-
ing,  (A), where 0 < 0; 00 < 0:9 Thus, instead of paying a price consumers
experience a disutility associated with advertising. In order to attract con-
sumers, rms can reduce the intensity of advertising instead of cutting the
price (in this case it is not feasible to discriminate between members of dif-
ferent linguistic communities). It turns out the main qualitative properties of
Proposition 1 remain unchanged with respect to the nancing channel (See
Appendix.) A rm that adopts the minority language will tend to increase
9See, for instance, Peitz and Valletti (2008) for an analogous comparison between pay-
tv versus free-to-air.
13
the intensity of advertising trying to exploit C-consumershigher willingness
to pay, but again the ability to appropriate a su¢ cient amount of surplus
using this channel is very limited.
2.4.4 Second best
The main result of this section is that market forces tend to deliver insuf-
cient linguistic diversity. This result provides a possible justication for
government intervention based purely on e¢ ciency grounds. A possible in-
strument would be production subsidies to suppliers of goods in minority
languages. However, in order to implement the rst best, we would need to
design those subsidies in a way that they eliminate the price distortion asso-
ciated to language choices. A much simpler policy would consist of subsidies
conditional only on language choices. In order to justify such policy we would
need to compare equilibrium outcomes with a second best scenario, in which
total welfare is computed conditional on the distortionary price behavior pre-
dicted in equilibrium. If we let  be the fraction of varieties supplied in the
minority language, then (see Appendix)   e; and the inequality is strict
for those parameter values such that   0: In other words, subsidies to
rms producing the good in the minority language can improve the e¢ ciency
of market outcomes.
3 Translations
Suppose now that each rm can choose one of the following three options:
(i) supply the product in S, (ii) supply the product in C, and (iii) supply two
linguistic versions of the product, one in S and one in C, and pay an extra
cost F > 0:10
Let us now denote by s; c the fractions of goods supplied exclusively in
S and C, respectively. Therefore, 1 s c is the fraction of goods supplied
in both languages (translations.)
10Books and lms are typically created in a particular language and then translated or
dubbed into other languages. It might be argued that something is lost in the process of
translation. Here, we disregard this possibility by treating both languages in a symmetric
fashion.
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3.1 The rst best
The fraction of varieties available in S and C is 1 c and 1 s; respectively.
As in the previous section, the optimal allocation of consumers in those
segments where the two varieties are supplied in a di¤erent language will
depend on whether  is higher or lower than 1: In the Appendix I present
the case  > 1, but in the text I restrict attention to the case   1: A
fraction (1  c)2 of S-consumers have access to two varieties in S and hence
the average surplus is R  1
4
: A fraction 2c have access to two varieties in C
and the average surplus is R      1
4
. Finally, a fraction 2c (1  c) have
access to one variety in each language and the average surplus taking into
account the optimal allocation of those consumers is R   1
4
  
2
+ 
2
4
: The
expressions are analogous for C consumers. Thus, total welfare is:
W (c; s) = R 
1
4
  

s (1  s)

1  
2

+ 2s

 
  (1  )

c (1  c)

1  
2

+ 2c

  F (1  s   c)
where s + c  1. If we denote by z  F then the candidates to be
the optimal values of s and c are given by the rst order conditions of an
interior solution:
es (z) =
8<:
0, if z  1  
2
1
2
+ z 1

, if 1  
2
 z  1 + 
2
1, if z  1 + 
2
ec (z) =
8><>:
0, if z
1   1  2
1
2
+
z
1  1

, if 1  
2
 z
1   1 + 2
1, if z
1   1 + 2
It turns out that es (z)+ec (z) is sometimes higher than 1 (the constraint
is binding). It will be useful to consider Condition A :
1  


1  
2

> 1 +

2
i.e.,
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 <
1
2

1  
2

Note that for those parameter values that satisfy Condition A the adop-
tion model prescribes  = 0:
If Condition A holds then for all values of z such that ec (z) > 0 we have
that es (z) = 1: Therefore, in this case the optimal values are c = 0 and
s = es (z) : That is, if z  1 + 2 , then all varieties are supplied exclusively
in S: However, as z falls below 1 + 
2
an increasing number of varieties is
supplied in both languages.
If Condition A fails then it is possible to have both s and 

c strictly pos-
itive. There are two possible regions. If z  (2  2) then s = es (2  2)
and c = ec (2  2). That is, if translation costs are su¢ ciently high
then there are no translations and language choices coincide with those of
the adoption model. Alternatively, if z < (2  2) ; then s = es (z) and
c = ec (z).
It is immediate to check that: (i) s  c , (ii) neither s nor c de-
crease with F; and (iii) both s and 

c may increase or decrease with : The
economic intuitions are straightforward.
3.2 Market equilibrium
The pricing game is analogous to the one discussed in Section 2.11 Thus,
equilibrium prices are given by:
pS (S) = 1 +
c
2
pC (S) = 1   (1  s)
2
pC (C) = 1 +
s
2
pS (C) = 1   (1  c)
2
11As in the adoption model, if  is su¢ ciently close to 2 then a symmetric equilibrium
in pure strategies does not exist.
16
Prots from supplying the product in S and C exclusively are given re-
spectively by:
S (s; c) = 

pS (C)
2
+ (1  ) pS (S)2
C (s; c) = 

pC (C)
2
+ (1  ) pC (S)2
Prots from supplying the product in both languages are given by:
SC (s; c) = 

pC (C)
2
+ (1  ) pS (S)2   F
In equilibrium, rms must be indi¤erent between those options which are
e¤ectively used. In particular, the equilibrium candidates of s and c are
given by the system of equations S (s; c) = 
C (s; c) = 
SC (s; c) :
If we solve the system disregarding the condition s + c  1, then the
equilibrium candidates are given by:
bs (z) =
8<:
0, if z  1  
4
1
2
+ 2(z 1)

, if 1  
4
 z  1 + 
4
1, if z  1 + 
4
bc (z) =
8><>:
0, if z
1   1  4
1
2
+
2( z1  1)

, if 1  
4
 z
1   1 + 4
1, if z
1   1 + 4
It is also the case that bs (z) + bc (z) is sometimes higher than 1. Thus,
we can divide the parameter space in two regions. Let us label Condition B :
1  


1  
4

> 1 +

4
i.e.,
 <
1
2

1  
4

Note that Condition A implies Condition B; but not viceversa. Also,
Condition B is necessary and su¢ cient to obtain e = 0 in the adoption
model.
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If Condition B holds, then for all z such that bc (z) > 0; bs (z) = 1. Thus,
in equilibrium ec = 0 and 
e
s =
bs (z). That is, if z > 1+ 4 then all varieties
are exclusively supplied in S. As z falls below 1 + 
4
and increasing number
of varieties is supplied in both languages:
If Condition B fails then both es and 
e
c can be strictly positive. If
z > 2 (1  ) then there will be no translation (es + ec = 1) and es =bs (2  2) ; ec = bc (2  2). In this case the equilibrium values coincide
with those computed in the adoption model . If z < 2 (1  ) then the
number of translations is strictly positive, and es = bs (z) ; ec = bc (z).
Once again, it is immediate to check that: (i) es  ec, (ii) neither es nor
ec decrease with F; and (iii) both 
e
s and 
e
c may increase or decrease with
:
We can now compare the equilibrium and the rst best allocations. Since
we have two endogenous variables we could in principle discuss the discrep-
ancy between social and private incentives to supply goods in each language,
and hence split the parameter space in four regions, depending on whether
(1  eh)   (1  h) = h   eh is positive or negative for each language h,
h = S;C. However, it is much more convenient to dene an index of linguis-
tic diversity. In particular, let  be the di¤erence between the total number
of varieties in C and the total number of varieties in S:12
  (1  s)  (1  c) = C   S
We can say that an equilibrium exhibits insu¢ cient (excessive) linguistic
diversity if e <  (e > ). It turns out that that the two regions are
simply dened by a threshold value, bz: If Condition B holds then bz = 1;
otherwise bz = 2 (1  )  1  
4

< 1:
This discussion is summarized in the next Proposition
Proposition 2 The equilibrium of the translations model may exhibit in-
su¢ cient or excessive linguistic diversity. More specically, there exists a
threshold value of z; bz; such that if z > bz then e   (if  >  1 then
e  ); and if z < bz then e   (if e < 0 then e > ):
Figure 4 depicts e and  in the three possible scenarios, depending on
whether or not Conditions A and B hold. In particular, Figure 4a correspond
12The main advantage of this index is that it preserves the linearity with respect to z:
An obvious alternative would be to dene the index as the proportion of varieties in C:
 = 1 s1 s+1 c : The main qualitative results are the same.
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to the case that both conditions hold, Figure 4b to the case Condition B holds
but Condition A fails, and Figure 4c to the case that both conditions fail.
The literature on product diversity under monopolistic competition has
emphasized that markets may generate too little or too much variety. The
last proposition apparently conveys a similar avor of ambiguity. However,
standard models of product variety provide little guidance about the set
of circumstances under which market bias has one sign or the opposite. In
contrast, in our model excessive or insu¢ cient linguistic diversity are closely
linked to observable variables. Thus, if we observe a relatively small fraction
of varieties in the minority language then the model suggests that there is
insu¢ cient linguistic diversity. However, if the fraction of translations is
relatively high then there is excessive linguistic diversity.13
Let us consider the following example. If Condition B holds then at
z = bz = 1 we have that ec = 0 and es = 12 : Thus, all varieties are available
in S; and one half are available in C: Hence, we need to worry about excessive
linguistic variety only when the fraction of varieties available in the minority
language is more than 1
3
, even though the relative weight of the minority
linguistic community could be arbitrarily low. If condition B fails then at
z = bz < 1 we have that ec = 0 and es < 12 . Hence, the number of translations
is higher than 1
2
. Summarizing:
Remark 3 The sign of the ine¢ ciency is closely linked to the degree of lin-
guistic diversity observed in equilibrium. In particular, excessive linguistic
diversity requires that more than one half of all possible varieties are supplied
in the minority language, independently of the relative size of the minority
linguistic community.
In order to gain some economic intuition about the result that the market
may provide either insu¢ cient or excessive linguistic diversity, let us consider
the limiting case  = 1
2
. In this case the size of both communities is the
same and the equilibrium level of linguistic diversity is always e¢ cient. In
fact, es = 
e
c  e and s = c  : However, private incentives could
be excessive or insu¢ cient with respect to social incentives. It turns out
that the level of translations in equilibrium and in the rst best are given,
respectively, by:
13The magnitude of the ine¢ ciency is very asymmetric. If F is very high then the loss
in total surplus associated to prot maximization may be quite large. However, if F is so
small that prot maximization leads to excessive linguistic diversity, then the loss in total
surplus is due to F being paid too many times and, hence, is likely to be very small.
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1  2e =
8<:
1; if z  1  
4
4(1 z)

; if 1  
4
 z  1
0; if z  1
1  2 =
8<:
1; if z  1  
2
2(1 z)

; if 1  
2
 z  1
0; if z  1
Therefore, the number of translations in equilibrium, whenever is strictly
positive, is socially excessive, except if the xed cost is so low that both in
equilibrium and in the rst best all varieties are translated (See Figure 5).
It is important to note that, in this model, translations do not expand
aggregate demand and they simply allow some consumers to access a better
combination of linguistic and non-linguistic characteristics. In most spatial
models with single-product rms and when aggregate demand e¤ects are
absent, there is a tendency towards excessive product variety. Private incen-
tives to introduce a new variety are higher than social incentives because all
customers of a new variety are stolen from rival rms.
In our model, suppliers are potentially multi-product rms and hence
must be concerned about the origin of the potential consumers of the second
version: some of them are stolen from rival rms but some others simply
switch across di¤erent linguistic versions of the same variety (the so-called
cannibalization e¤ect). Thus, the strength of the business-stealing e¤ect is
directly proportional to the weakness of the cannibalization e¤ect. If the
number of translations is small then the cannibalization e¤ect is relatively
important, which moderates private incentives to translate. In this case
the market outcome turns out to be close to the rst best. However, as
the number of translations increases the cannibalization e¤ect gets weaker
(the business stealing e¤ect gets stronger) and private incentives to translate
overgrow private incentives.
Summarizing, Proposition 2 is a combination of the underprovision of
linguistic variety in the adoption model (Proposition 1) and the excessive
private incentives to translate. If the xed cost of translation is high then
the number of translations is small and the forces behind Proposition 1 dom-
inate. If the xed cost is su¢ ciently low, then the dominant e¤ect is the
excessive private incentives to translate and we end up with excessive lin-
guistic variety.14
14It may be important to note that rmsprots increase if the number of translations is
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4 Concluding remarks
In some cultural goods and media markets it seems prohibitively expensive
to supply the same content in more than one language. The model presented
in this paper predicts that, under laissez-faire, the level of linguistic diversity
in these markets will be ine¢ ciently low. From a positive viewpoint, this
result may contribute to explain why consumption in minority languages is
surprisingly low in regions with bilingual population (like the case of Catalo-
nia discussed in the introduction). It could also rationalize some widespread
concerns about the potential negative consequences of the expansion of Eng-
lish as a second language on the use and development of other languages.
From a normative point of view, this result can justify on purely e¢ ciency
grounds certain public policies that aim at protecting minority languages.
However, the analysis also suggests that the development of new technolo-
gies that reduce the costs of translations is likely to improve the e¢ ciency of
market outcomes; and, in the limit, it could even result in an overprovision
of goods in minority languages.
The main results of the paper are shown to be robust to changes in var-
ious specic assumptions of the base model: (i) whether or not members of
the majority community are competent in the minority language, (ii) rms
ability to price discriminate between members of the various linguistic com-
munities, (iii) rmsnancing channels (charging a price versus advertising),
and (iv) comparison of the equilibrium allocation with the rst or the second
best allocations. The latter point is particularly relevant for policy implica-
tions. In the context of the adoption model, for instance, the government
can raise total welfare by using at subsidies to rms supplying the good in
the minority language.
The role of other assumptions is more di¢ cult to assess. For instance,
it was assumed, rst, that all potential varieties are produced and, as a
result, language choices do not a¤ect aggregate sales, and, second, that con-
sumer preferences over language and intrinsic characteristics are independent.
These assumptions contribute decisively to the tractability and transparency
of the model and they certainly have an impact on both the equilibrium and
reduced below the equilibrium level. The reason is that when each individual rm decides
whether or not to translate it does not take into account the e¤ect on other rmsprots
(business-stealing). This result may explain why an important cartel of lm distributors
(with an e¤ective monopoly power over translations) refuses to dub lms into Catalan
even when a large fraction of the cost is paid by the Catalan regional government.
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the rst best allocations. However, they do not seem essential for the main
qualitative results of the paper.
5 References
Caminal, R. and Ll. Granero (2008), Multi-product rms and product vari-
ety, mimeo.
Chen, Y. and M. Riordan (2007), Price and Variety in the Spokes Model,
The Economic Journal, vol. 117, No. 522, 897-921.
Church, J. and I. King (1993), Bilingualism and network externalities,
Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 36, No.2, 337-45.
Dixit, A. and J. Stiglitz (1997), Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity, American Economic Review 67 (3), 297-308.
Ginsburgh, V., I. Ortuño-Ortín, and S. Weber (2005), Disenfranchisement
in Linguistically Diverse Societies: The Case of the European Union, Journal
of the European Economic Association, Vol. 3, Issue 4, 946-65.
Ginsburgh, V., S. Weber, and S. Weyers (2007), Economics of literary
translation: A simple theory and evidence, CEPR Discussion Paper No.6432.
Graddol, D. (2006), English next, published by the British Council. Avail-
able at: http:/www.britishcouncil.org/learning-research-english-next.pdf
John, A. and Kei-Mu Yi (2001), Language and Location, mimeo.
Lazear, E. (1999), Culture and Language, Journal of Political Economy,
Vol. 107, Issue 6, 95-126.
Mankiw, G. and M. Whinston (1986), Free Entry and Social Ine¢ ciency,
Rand Journal of Economics 17 (1), 48-58.
Melitz, J. (2007a), The impact of English dominance on literature and
welfare, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 64, 193-215.
Melitz, J. (2007b), Language and Foreign Trade, European Economic
Review, vol. 52, Issue 4, 667-699.
Ortega, J. and T. Tangeras (2008), Unilingual Versus Bilingual Education
System: A Political Economy Analysis, Journal of the European Economic
Association, vol. 6, Issue 5, 1078-1108.
Peitz, M. and T. Valletti (2008), Content and advertising in the media:
Pay-tv versus free-to-air, International Journal of Industrial Organization 26
(4), 949-965.
Salop, S. (1979), Monopolistic Competition with Outside Goods, The Bell
Journal of Economics 10 (1), 141-156.
22
Selten, R. and J. Pool (1991), The Distribution of Foreign Language
Skills as a Game Equilibrium, in R. Selten (ed.), Game Equilibrium Models
IV: Social and Political Interaction, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 64-87.
6 Appendix
6.1 The adoption model without price discrimination
Let ps and pc the prices set in equilibrium by a rm supplying a variety in S
and in C, respectively. Hence, in contrast to the analysis of Section 2, rms
cannot price discriminate according to linguistic preferences.
In those segments where consumers have access to one variety in each
language, we denote by xC (C) and xC (S) the fraction of C-consumers that
purchase the variety in C and in S, respectively. If both xC (C) and xC (S)
belong to the interval [0; 2] then they are given by:
xC (C) = 1 + + pS   pC
xC (S) = 1  + pS   pC
Let us rst consider the case  < 1. Then, both xC (C) and xC (S) belong
to the interval [0; 2] if 1    > pS   pC >    1: However, a rm can never
nd it optimal to supply the variety in C and set a price within this interval.
More specically, if rm i adopts S then total sales are given by:
qSi = 

1 + (1  2)+ pC   pi

+ (1  ) 1 + pS   pi
Alternatively, rm is sales from adopting C are given by:
qCi = 
 
1 + pC   pi

+ (1  ) 1  (1  2)+ pS   pi
For all pi in the relevant range; qSi > q
C
i : That is, adopting C would imply
a contraction of demand and hence it cannot be optimal. Therefore, if a rm
adopts C it must be because it intends to set a su¢ ciently high price so that
xC (S) = 0: More specically, rm is prots from adopting C can be written
as:
Ci = pi


 
1 + pC   pi

+ (1  )  1 + + pS   pi	
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provided 1 + + pS   pi  2:
Evaluating the rst order condition of an interior solution at pi = pC we
obtain the candidate of the "joint" reaction function of rms supplying their
varieties in C:
pC =
 + (1  )  1 + + pS
 + 2 (1  ) (1)
Firm is prots from adopting S can be written as:
Si = pi




 
1  + pC   pi

+ 2 (1  )+ (1  )  1 + pS   pi	
provided 1  + pC   pi  0:
Evaluating the rst order condition at pi = pS we obtain the candidate
of the "joint" reaction function of rms supplying their varieties in S:
pS =
1 +      1 +   pC
1   + 2 (2)
Thus, equations (1) and (2) can determine the equilibrium values of pS
and pC for a given .
The equilibrium value of  is given by the equal prots condition evalu-
ated at equilibrium prices: S () = C () ; which are given by:
S () = ps




 
1  + pC   pS+ 2 (1  )+ (1  )	
C () = pC

 + (1  )  1 + + pS   pC	
We can now compute the parameter values for which e  0: Note that
pS ( = 0) = 1; and pC ( = 0) = 1 + 
2
. Using these prices the inequal-
ity S ( = 0)  C ( = 0) is equivalent to   2

1p

  1

: Thus, in the
absence of price discrimination, the set of parameters that can sustain an
equilibrium with a positive fraction of C-products is smaller than in the case
of price discrimination.
Equations (1) and (2) plus the equal prots condition determine the
equilibrium values provided no rm has incentives to deviate from the pro-
posed behavior. However, if  is su¢ ciently high then rms producing a
24
product in S nd it optimal to deviate and set a higher price, pd, pd =
(1 )
1    1+p
S
2
, and give up selling to C-consumers with access to a variety in
C; i.e., 1    + pC   pd < 0: In this case a symmetric equilibrium in pure
strategies does not exist. Note that if  = 0 there are no incentives to devi-
ate. These incentives are present only if  is su¢ ciently high which involves
a higher value of :
Numerical simulations can provide a good idea of the extent of the exis-
tence problem as well as the market bias against minority language in cases
a symmetric equilibrium does exist. A selection of results are given in the
following table (n.e. stands for "no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies
exists"):
   e
0.3 1.66 0.214 0.024
0.3 1.7 0.217 n.e.
0.35 1.4 0.267 0.054
0.35 1.5 0.275 n.e.
0.4 1.2 0.329 0.107
0.4 1.3 0.338 n.e
0.45 1 0.400 0.075
0.45 1.1 0.408 0.3
0.45 1.2 0.414 n.e.
6.2 Asymmetric bilingualism
Let us now consider the case that only C-consumers are bilingual, while S-
consumers are monolingual. In other words, C-consumers incur a utility loss,
, if they consume a product in S, but S-consumers experience an innite
utility loss if they consume the product in C.
Let us begin by computing the rst best allocation for the case  < 1:
Among those consumers with access to two C-varieties only C-consumers
can enjoy a positive surplus. Since they must consume the closest variety
the maximum total surplus is 
 
R  1
4

. The allocation of consumers with
access to one variety in each language depends on their linguistic preferences.
C-consumers are willing to consume the variety in S if their distance is lower
than 1 , and S-consumers always consume the variety in S, independently
of their location. Thus, the maximum total surplus is 

R  1
4
  
2
+ 
2
4

+
(1  )  R  1
2

: Finally, consumers with access to two varieties in S always
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choose the closest variety and the maximum total surplus is R   1
4
  .
Thus, total welfare can be written as:
W () = 2

R  1
4

+2 (1  )



R  1
4
  
2
+
2
4

+ (1  )

R  1
2

 
  (1  )2

R  1
4
  

Thus, the optimal fraction of varieties is:
 = max
(
0;

2
(1 + )2   1
2
2 (1  )  R  1
4

+ 
 
1 + 2
  1
)
Note that  > 0 if and only if  > 1p

  1:
In case   1, the maximum total surplus for those consumers with access
to one variety in each language is R  1
2
and the optimal fraction of varieties
is:
 = max

0;
2  1
2
2 (1  )R  3 
2
+ 2

It can easily be checked that  is lower in cases where S-consumers are
unable to enjoy a product in C.
In the market game competition for C-consumers is exactly like that in
Section 2.3. However, rms supplying the good in C cannot compete for
S-consumers. As a result, pS (S) = 1+
1  :
Prots are now given by:
S () = 

1  
2
2
+ (1  ) (1 + )
2
1  
C () = 

1 +
 (1  )
2
2
Again, in equilibrium S (e) = C (e) : In this case it is not feasible to
compute e explicitly: But it can immediately be seen that e > 0 if and
only if  > 2

1p

  1

: Thus, for those parameters that dene the limits
of this set,  > 0: In other words, asymmetric bilingualism simply reduces
both the optimal fraction of varieties in C and the equilibrium fraction. But
the qualitative properties of Proposition 1 still hold.
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6.3 Advertising
Suppose consumers experience a utility loss which depends on the intensity
of advertising,  (A) = A
2
2c
: Thus, if consumers choose between two varieties
in S then demand for variety i is given by:
xi = 1 +
A2   A2i
2c
where Ai and A are the advertising revenue of rm i and the average rm,
respectively. Hence, rm i chooses Ai in order to maximize i = Aixi. In
a symmetric equilibrium, Ai = A =
p
c: Thus, if  = 0 rms make prots
S ( = 0) =
p
c:
If a rm j considers supplying the good in C then, for reasons discussed
in Subsection 5.1, it aims at selling exclusively to C-consumers. In this case,
the optimal level of advertising, Aj, maximizes:
j = Aj

1 + +
c2   A2j
2c

Thus, the maximum amount of prots is C ( = 0) = 
p
c
 
1 + 2
3
 3
2 :
The set of parameters that involve e  0 is given by S ( = 0)  S ( = 0) :
Note that this set is a subset of the set of parameters that support e  0 in
the case rms can extract consumer surplus through prices, but they cannot
discriminate between members of di¤erent linguistic communities (Section
5.1). In other words, the advertising channel reinforces the underprovision
of linguistic diversity.
6.4 The second best
Let us characterize the second best allocation; that is, the optimal ; denoted
; conditional on the allocation of consumers resulting from distortionary
prices. In other words, in those segments where consumers have access to
one variety in C and one in S, rms would set equilibrium prices computed
in section 2.3. Thus, in these segments only those C-consumers located at
a distance lower than 1
2
  
4
from the S-variety purchase this one and the
rest purchase the C-variety. Similarly, only those S-consumers located at a
distance lower than 1
2
+ 
4
from the S-variety purchase this one, and the rest
purchase the C-variety. Total surplus obtained in these segments is given by
R  1
4
  
2
+ 3
2
16
:
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Finally, we can write the total surplus obtained in a second best allocation
as:
W SB () = R  1
4
  2 (1  )+ 2 (1  )

 
2
+
32
16

  (1  )2 
As a result, the second best level of is :
 = max

0;
1
2
  4 (1  2)
3

If we compare the above equation with those corresponding to the rst
best and equilibrium, we conclude that     e, and the inequalities
are strict except in the case that both variables take value zero. We can
conclude that there is room for a simple policy intervention consisting on
subsidies exclusively based on language choices.
6.5 The translation model for  > 1
If   1
W (c; s) = R 
1
4
 

s (1  s)
1
2
+ 2s

 (1  )

c (1  c)
1
2
+ 2c

 F (1  s   c)
and the optimal values of c ; 

s are given by:
s =
8><>:
0, if F  
2
F

  1
2
2 1 , if

2
 F    2  1
2

1, if F    2  1
2

c =
8><>:
0, if F  1 
2
F
1   12
2 1 , if
1 
2
 F  (1  )  2  1
2

1, if F  (1  )  2  1
2

provided c + 

s  1:
It can be easily checked that Proposition 2 also holds for  > 1:
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